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ABSTRACT
Recent political theory has attempted to unbundle demos and ethnos,and thus citizens-
hipfromnationalidentity.Therearetwopossiblewaystomeet thischallenge:bytaming
therelationshipbetweencitizenshipand thenation,forexample,bydefendingaformof
liberalmulticulturalnationalism,orbytranscendingit withapostnational,cosmopolitan
conceptionofcitizenship.Bothstrategiesrunupagainst theboundednessofdemocratic
authority.In this paper,I argue that Shachar adresses this issue in an innovative way,but
remainsultimatelytrappedbyit.Myargument hastwoparts.Inthefirst one,Ilookat the
analogy between property and citizenship on which Shachar rely to justify the obliga-
tionsofwealthystatestowardstheglobalpoor.Isuggest that it doesnot workwelltoex-
plain the rarity of citizenship and that the idea of taxing its value at the global level,
however intuitive in liberal theory on property, could yield unexpected and non-liberal
consequences.NeverthelessIalsoassessitsmerits.Inthesecondpart,Isuggest that Sha-
char’sclaimthat herargument generatesalegalobligationtowardtheglobalpoorisnot
binding. It could only be so with the kind of cosmopolitan political institutions that she
eschews.Thus we return where we begin.
RÉSUMÉ
La théorie politique récente a tenté de dénouer les liens entre le demos et l’ethnos dans
lessociétéslibérales,ainsiquelelienentrelacitoyennetéet l’identiténationale.Onpeut
répondre à ce défi de deux manières différentes: soit en apprivoisant le lien entre la ci-
toyenneté et la nation,par exemple,en défendant une forme de nationalisme multicul-
turel libéral, soit en le transcendant à l’aide d’une conception postnationale ou
cosmopolitiquedelacitoyenneté.Cesdeuxstratégiesprésentent toutefoisdesdifficultés
du point de vue de l’autorité démocratique.Dans cet article,je soutiens que Shachar ap-
porte une contribution originale à ce débat, mais qu’en dernière analyse, elle demeure
prisonnière de ce dilemme. Mon argument procède en deux parties. Dans la première,
j’examine l’analogie entre la propriété et la citoyenneté sur laquelle Shachar fonde les
obligationsmoralesdesÉtatsrichesenverslespauvres.Jefaisvaloirqu’ellerépondmalau
problème de la rareté de la citoyenneté et que l’idée de taxer la valeur de cette dernière
à l’échelle globale, pour intuitive qu’elle soit dans la pensée libérale, pourrait avoir des
conséquences imprévues et non libérales. Je reconnais néanmoins ses mérites. Dans la
secondepartie,jemontrequelaprétentiondeShacharàl’effet d’avancerunargument qui
comporte une obligation légale envers les pauvres de la planète n’est pas fondée.Elle ne
pourrait l’êtrequesil’ondisposait d’institutionspolitiquescosmopolitiquesglobales,une
possibilité qu’elle rejette.Or,cela nous reconduit à notre point de départ.
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2Ayelet Shachar’s new book addresses some of the most pressing issues of our
times in a creative and theoretically innovative way. The two big ideas she pro-
poses that will concern me here are first, the analogy between citizenship and
property; and second, the attempt, through this analogy, to provide a new way
of justifying the obligations of wealthy states and their citizens towards the
global poor. I want to begin by making some general remarks about the relation
between citizenship and membership and then turn to these two ideas. I will con-
clude with a brief set of critical remarks—or at least a puzzle—about what I
take to beAyelet’s central moral claim.
1
There are at least three dimensions to citizenship: self-government, protection
and membership. Citizenship is meant to embody our status as a member of a
self-governing community, a status that is both legal and moral: It represents a
form of public standing based on public recognition and respect (a status held by
individuals, but whose value is communally generated, to borrow one of
Shachar’s formulations). As a citizen, I am not only both author and addressee
of the law, but also offered protection with regard to some of my most basic in-
terests, and entitled to a set of valuable goods and resources; that is, nothing less
than the structure within which to lead a decent life. To become a citizen is to
acquire, therefore, the capacity to some form of self-government and to become
a member of a bounded political community. Ethnos and demos overlap when
one’s membership in a demos is linked in some way to one’s membership of a
particular national community.
In recent political theory there has been an attempt to unbundle demos and eth-
nos, and thus citizenship from national identity. The moral claim (aside from
any empirical or pragmatic one) is that in diverse, multicultural societies, citi-
zenship should not be dependent on national identity, since this would make the
important goods linked to citizenship (autonomy, membership and protection),
dependent on a potentially narrow and exclusive form of identity. There are, at
least, two possible responses to this kind of worry: (i) to defend a form of lib-
eral multicultural nationalism, such that citizenship and national identity over-
lap, but that national identity is multicultural and inclusive, as opposed to narrow
and exclusive; and (ii) to detach citizenship from nationality and states in gen-
eral, and link it instead to discourses of human rights and membership in some
kind of global political community, cosmopolitan solidarity, or ‘humanity’. The
first move seeks to ‘tame’the relation between citizenship and the nation, the lat-
ter to transcend it.1
Here we face a familiar paradox or tension:The universalism of our ethics—that
each individual is of fundamental equal worth and dignity—runs up against the
boundedness of democratic authority. To define citizenship, no matter how in-
clusively, requires saying something about who should be denied that status.
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2How can we justify such exclusions? A democratic people can’t, by definition,
democratically define itself, since in order to do so it would already need to be
a people. For example, the Maastricht definition of European citizenship awards
citizenship to members of any constituent state: this immediately excludes the
large ‘resident alien’population present in Europe—one upon which many Eu-
ropean economies depend2.
One of the most striking developments in global politics in recent years has been
the rise of the discourse of human rights and the slow emergence of transna-
tional modes of governance and rights protection (once again, the EU is an ex-
ample).Thus cosmopolitan or postnational citizenship is the idea that citizenship
is defined by one’s membership not in any particular political community (and
therefore vulnerable to being revoked or denied according to particularistic con-
siderations), but by one’s membership in ‘humanity’, or some kind of postna-
tional political order. But for postnational or cosmopolitan citizenship to be
meaningful it must be the case that cosmopolitan norms of justice are both bind-
ing outside of the state and authoritative within it.They can’t simply be imposed
on the basis of pre-given philosophical authority (either via God or Kant or
whomever), but must appeal to some notion of democratic self-determination.
Our universal ethics must be reconciled with the particularity of democratic au-
thority and law.At the very least, the validity of cosmopolitan norms of justice
must be grasped from within the perspective of the demos in some way. But here
we face some difficult questions: Why and how would the demos incorporate
those norms? How do we mediate between the seemingly unavoidable bound-
edness of democratic authority and the universal values associated with cosmo-
politan justice3?
Anumber of political theorists have emphasized the extent to which citizenship
and human rights are beginning to become entwined in various ways. One way
to think of what is happening is the slow unbundling of rights from citizenship.
That is, that the gap between the protections and obligations of citizenship and
those owed to any person who finds themself within the boundaries of a state
should narrow—and eventually disappear. Clearly, states and others have obli-
gations to protect the basic human rights and liberties of whoever is present
within their borders (as difficult as this has been to ensure in practice).Afurther
claim is that states are obliged to enable non-nationals to secure the means to var-
ious other important interests—for example, to accommodate various religious
practise, to provide voting rights, to provide access to education, welfare and
other services.What is important to notice about this argument, however, is that
it can go in two different directions.
If unbundling is not accompanied simultaneously by the liberalization of the
means to become a citizen (ie. the liberalization of naturalization), then it risks
entrenching a division between citizenship and what we might call subjecthood.
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2The distinction between citizenship and non-citizenship, in other words, be-
comes meaningful for all the wrong reasons. This is arguably what happened
withTurkish migrants in Germany, where they were originally admitted as guest-
workers and allowed to stay for long periods of time, but remained cut off from
the full range of civil and social rights possessed by German citizens. There has
been increasing debate about the extent to which greater rights and a more lib-
eral naturalization process should be extended to migrants in Germany, as well
as in other parts of Europe.To the extent that unbundling occurs without the lib-
eralization of naturalization, it can entrench inequality as opposed to mediating
it4.To the extent that unbundling occurs with the liberalization of naturalization,
it arguably serves as a process of ‘proto-citizenship’—socializing both non-cit-
izens and citizens into the wider political system and helping to create the con-
ditions for trust and legitimation of important political institutions.
But note how this argument repeats the tensions mentioned above. Is the idea that
we should be seeking to transcend the nation-state and national citizenship al-
together, or rather tame it by making national citizenship more inclusive and
compatible with basic human rights norms?The problem is that almost every lib-
eral democracy,Australia included, has at one time or another promoted a vision
of national identity (and thus accompanying processes of naturalization and in-
tegration) that was hostile to many of the peoples seeking refuge on their shores
(as well as those who were here long before European settlement).And this leads
some to suggest we should renounce the link between citizenship and national-
ity altogether.
Consider, for example, the kind of language found in the recent Becoming an
Australian Citizen policy document, one motivated by a desire to be more ex-
plicit about the nature ofAustralian citizenship5. The discussion paper refers to
common ‘Australian’values—such as respect for equal worth and dignity of the
individual, freedom of speech and association—reflect “Judeo-Christian ethics,
a British political heritage and the spirit of European Enlightenment”6. The idea
of a citizenship test, in other words, seems targeted at a very specific sub-set of
the population, as opposed to a genuinely inclusive community-building exer-
cise.As I mentioned before, another key test is whether the push towards a more
explicit definition of citizenship is accompanied by a liberalization of not only
naturalization processes (which has occurred inAustralia and Canada), but also
the continued unbundling of rights and citizenship in relation to the most vul-
nerable non-citizens—eg. asylum seekers and refugees (which arguably has
not).
However, as I have suggested, it is not immediately apparent that a notion of
post-national citizenship can escape these tensions and dilemmas either. If there
is such a thing of global citizenship then it remains vague and difficult to see how
it can effectively deliver the goods of citizenship—self-government, protection
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2and membership.And it also remains to be seen to what extent the validity of the
universal norms of justice to which it appeals can be grasped by a demos in such
a way that they acquire genuine democratic authority.
2
As in her previous book, Multicultural Jurisdictions7, in her new book Shachar
takes aim at many of the standard distinctions and assumptions in the field and
provides a fresh re-orientation of the existing conceptual landscape. In that ear-
lier work, Shachar provided a deft diagnosis of the ‘multicultural dilemma’
(“your culture or your rights”), followed by an innovative set of arguments and
case studies that sought to dissolve (or at least lessen) the dilemma through a
careful balancing of the accommodation of cultural and ethnic difference with
the rights of women and vulnerable minorities.
In The Birthright Lottery8 she performs another set of deft conceptual manoeu-
vres. This time she takes aim at some of the dilemmas I have outlined above
and at what she claims are the unjustified privileges encased in the principle of
birthright citizenship, whether understood in terms of jus soli or jus sanguinis.
If the goods and resources associated with citizenship of a particular political
community are significant—as they clearly are—then how can the mere cir-
cumstances of birth serve as the core determinants of one’s entitlement to these
goods and resources? This way of framing the question has a very powerful ef-
fect of turning around a common perception about the moral basis of the rela-
tionship between citizenship and immigration—that citizenship (and thus
immigration) is a privilege, whose distribution is a matter of discretion for those
who already possesses it. Instead, Shachar asks whether our practices and poli-
cies are not, in fact, constrained by duties to those who are excluded from the
goods of citizenship. Once again, she proposes a fresh angle on a familiar re-
sponse to this challenge: She embraces neither the cosmopolitan open borders
argument, nor variations of the communitarian and democratic self-government
argument. Instead, she introduces the idea of a ‘Birthright Privilege Levy’(BPL),
which is essentially—given her account of citizenship as a form of property—
an inheritance tax. So she assumes that bounded political communities will con-
tinue to exist and indeed that states will continue to be the dominant political
form in global politics for some time to come, but proposes that we tax the ben-
efits citizenship confers to improve the opportunities of those excluded by the
boundaries of the well-off states.
One of the key planks in the structure of her argument is the analogy between
citizenship and property. It’s the key analogy in the book and much of her argu-
ment depends on our accepting it. Shachar provides two general pictures or con-
ceptions of property, a narrow and a broad view.The narrow view she associates
with the kind of ‘possessive individualism’ described by C.B Macpherson and
Robert Nozick. According to the narrow view, the emphasis is on property en-
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2tailing a strong right to exclude others from what you legitimately own, and acts
as an equally strong constraint on what can legitimately be asked of you in terms
of your obligations to others. She ties this concept of property to a general con-
ception of social life as well—one in which “all inter-social interactions are char-
acterizedas ‘trades’” and where “social atomism and unrestricted commodification
rule, and where self interest is the core motivation for human action”9.
According to the broader view of property, on the other hand, property is un-
derstood not primarily as a narrow, exclusive right to the tangible things to which
it often refers, but rather as a “human made and multifaceted institution that cre-
ates and maintains certain relations among individuals in reference to things”
(27). As Jeremy Waldron puts it (cited by Shachar), property relations offer a
“system of rules governing access to and control of scarce resources” (29). Own-
ership and possession of property affects peoples’ life-chances, opportunities
and freedoms and thus conflicting interests arise around access, use and control
of those goods—both tangible and intangible—that are scarce. This means,
argues Shachar, that changes in social relations and values will modify our sense
of what counts as protected property as well as (at least potentially) what the
very nature of property is. And here is where her argument goes to work: the
claim is that (a) citizenship is indeed property in this broader sense; and (b) that
we should thus modify our existing practices and understandings of citizenship
as property in such a way that the social relations they generate (and reify)
are transformed.
Citizenship is a form of property then, in the sense that “what each citizen holds
is not a private entitlement to a tangible thing, but a relationship to other mem-
bers and to a particular (usually the national) government that creates enforce-
able rights and duties”10. If so, then it follows that it is patently wrong to
distribute citizenship on the basis of the circumstances of someone’s birth given
the entitlements it delivers to the holder. The fact that I was born in Montreal,
have anAustralian partner and live in Sydney should not be the crucial factor in
determining whether my children will have the resources and opportunities to
lead decent lives, as opposed to children growing up in Somalia. It’s not that
birthright citizenship creates global wealth disparities in itself, but that it reifies
and perpetuates very different life prospects11.
I want to pause here and consider the analogy between property and citizenship a
bit more closely. There is no question that it is an enlightening way of approach-
ing the issue of global justice and our obligations to those excluded from our bor-
ders. It is one of the important contributions this book makes to our thinking about
global justice today. However, I think the analogy needs some further analysis.
Shachar wants to draw an analogy between the legal notion of entail—the
hereditary transfer of an estate that binds the hands of future generations in var-
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2ious ways—and the ‘entail’ of political membership. The discrediting of the
former should cause us to question the seeming continuation of the latter. This
is a powerful analogy and quite persuasive. But at least in some respects, the
entail of political membership strikes me as importantly different from the case
of inherited property. Citizenship is (at least in principle) much more fluid and
changeable in nature then property tends to be. This is partly to do with the fact
that the determination of political membership involves the construction and ex-
ercise of a certain kind of group right.Apolity is free to amend its definition of
membership in a range of ways (even the boundaries of itself—although that
raises a host of problems). Moreover it’s not clear that citizenship is an inherently
scarce good—like land or natural resources—but is made so by states. So al-
though both property and citizenship can be inherited, they also strike me as
quite different things in themselves. However, perhaps this begs the question
that Shachar is ultimately posing about the relation between property and citi-
zenship.
Shachar draws a fairly stark dichotomy between what is usually present in any
reasonable conception of property. As we know from as far back (at least) as
John Locke, property is both inclusive and exclusive in nature.To have property
in something is to have the right to exclude others from it, but never absolutely
and always subject to various other conditions. I can exclude strangers from my
house, but not if they are starving, or in need of urgent shelter or protection.
Shachar embraces a relational and non-exclusive conception of property, but in
doing so she risks undermining the rationale for thinking about citizenship as
property in the first place. If property is as non-exclusive and relational as she
suggests then why focus on taxation at all?Why would anyone have the right to
exclude others from their property in the first place? Why not simply cut to the
chase and attack the idea of birthright citizenship directly?
The answer no doubt is partly linked to Shachar’s desire to take states as they are,
at least to a certain extent, as a concession to what is genuinely possible in the
world today. And yet this move is aligned with—at least along one dimension
—a fairly radical re-conceptualization of property as it is generally understood
in the world, as we know it. On the other hand, Shachar is appealing to the em-
inent reasonableness of not allowing inherited wealth to account for large social
inequalities, a principle many advanced democracies already accept.And so, if
citizenship is akin to inherited property, and if most liberal democratic polities
accept the legitimacy of some form of inheritance tax on intergenerational trans-
fers of wealth, then most should also accept something like the BPL. However,
persisting with the analogy to property does leave some hostages to fortune, just
insofar as it risks (perhaps unintentionally) reifying the very exclusive aspects
of the concept—however much Shachar wants us to embrace the inclusive and
relational model12. One need only consider the debate over the repeal of inheri-
tance tax in the United States to see how easily the core assumption at the heart
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2of Shachar’s argument about the reasonableness of taxing intergenerational
wealth can be undone13. The revaluation of what counts as protected property
can go in many directions—not all of them welcome from the perspective of lib-
eral justice.
But having expressed two concerns about the analogy with property, let me men-
tion two ways in which the analogy is particularly helpful. First of all, the vision
of an inclusive and relational conception of property that is shaped by a more
complex sense of our relational and mutual obligations across borders is a very
welcome contribution to debates around distributive justice more generally. It
bears an intriguing resemblance to the way legal and political theorists have
been thinking about the property rights of indigenous peoples, for example, and
the way they can not only be accommodated within western legal systems, but
help transform them as well.14
Secondly, the argument generates a nice analogy for the second part of Shachar’s
project—what she calls the ‘jus nexi’ membership rule15. If our legal systems
can allow someone who possesses property belonging to another for a sufficient
period of time without the owner’s permission to acquire title to that property—
so long as the occupation is peaceful, continuous and visible—then so should
long term residents, having settled and participated in public life in various ways,
be entitled to citizenship (as opposed to merely nominal heirs). This is an at-
tractive way of rethinking what we mean by ‘naturalisation’.
My final comment concerns Shachar’s claim that her argument generates not
simply moral but legal obligations towards the global poor.The core of her moral
argument against birthright citizenship is that those of us who have benefited
from the arbitrary distribution of advantages have a positive duty to help those
disadvantaged (in morally unacceptable ways) from being excluded (compare
this with Thomas Pogge’s claim that wealthy states have a negative duty to not
to contribute to the maintenance of structures that entail the violation of basic
human rights)16.Alegal system should not entrench barriers to equal opportunity
on the basis of morally arbitrary traits like the circumstances of one’s birth.
Shachar claims that her proposal moves claims for redistribution “from the realm
of charity or morality to that of legal obligation, one that grows coherently from
the analogy to inherited property”17. But I am not sure that it does: Or at least, I
am not sure I how it does in ways that Thomas Pogge or Peter Singer’s argu-
ments, for example, don’t, which she seems to imply. What makes her moral
claim any more likely to be legally binding than Pogge’s or Singer’s? The BPL
certainly follows from her core moral claim, but that in itself doesn’t establish
its legal bindingness. Moreover, if it were to be genuinely legally binding, then
it would seem to require the kind of cosmopolitan political institutions that she
elsewhere eschews. How else would such a legal claim, for example, be en-
forced? This returns us to some of the paradoxes and tensions with which we
began between cosmopolitan and national citizenship.
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mopolitanism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006).
4 Of course, in some cases, migrants might not want to naturalize and so the issue of sub-
jecthood might not seem to arise. But I think in some circumstances, even if migrants do not
wish to naturalize and therefore do not resent or feel constrained by barriers to naturaliza-
tion, it might still be a problem from the perspective of egalitarian justice.
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12 I discuss the idea of rights more generally conceived as property in Rights, Stocksfield,
Acumen, 2008, chapter 3.
13 See Michael J. Graetz and Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight over Taxing
Inherited Wealth, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005.
14 See some of the contributions in Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton and Will Sanders eds. Politi-
cal Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2000; also N. Pearson, “Principles of Communal NativeTitle”, 5 (3), 2000, Indigenous Law
Bulletin, p. 4; and some of the interesting comments in the judgment in Western Australia
v Ward [2002] HCA28, 8August 2002. For the broader argument alluded to here see Dun-
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15 Birthright Lottery, p. 185.
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